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Food Brexit and chlorinated chicken: a microcosm of wider food problems 
In: Political Quarterly 
Erik Millstone, Tim Lang, and Terry Marsden 
Abstract 
This paper situates food safety concerns raised in the Brexit debate since the 
Referendum and suggests that, although the issue of chlorinated chicken entered 
public discourse, it represents wider concerns about food safety standards. Food 
safety has had high resonance in the UK since the 1980s but Brexit shows how it 
connects to wider concerns also raised about Brexit such as impacts on healthcare, 
the effects of austerity on food poverty, the limitations of low waged employment, 
concerns about migration and labour markets, and regional economic disparities. 
B e it s i pa t o  the UK food system is immense because food has been highly 
integrated into EU governance. While food standards can be portrayed as a single 
narrow issue, the paper suggests it provides a useful lens with which to examine, 
interrogate and comprehend these wider Brexit politics. The complex realities of food 
politics and wider food system dynamics undermine any simplistic political narrative 
of taki g a k o t ol . 
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Introduction 
Much of what little public discourse there has been about food and Brexit since the 
Referendum has focussed on one issue, namely food safety standards, typified by 
hlo i e- ashed hi ke .  This paper proposes that food can and should be 
recognised as providing a useful lens through which to examine wider Brexit politics, 
the complex realities of which undermine a simplisti  politi al a ati e of taki g 
a k o t ol .  The dynamics of the UK food system cannot be reduced to a battle 
between the European Union (EU) and national interests. In a food world where 
multi-national corporations have immense power, for example, post-Brexit food 
governance is unlikely to be a nirvana. Indeed, Brexit or no Brexit, food already raises 
numerous questions about the unequal distribution and about how power is 
exercised and whose interests dominate. Whoever wins or loses, it is already clear 
that the entire British agri-food system will experience considerable change; more so, 
if there is an abrupt policy régime change. One thing is certain, questions about the 
futu e of the UK s food s ste , post-Brexit, are not simply a matter of forecasting. 
Big policy choices will be made, whether the public is consulted or not.   In that 
sense, the chlorinated chicken issue and its resonance with the public – appearing in 
cartoons, jokes, focus groups – fires a shot across the bows of negligent politicians. 
Whatever their positions on Brexit, few people want weakened food standards. 
 
Prior to the 2016 Referendum, the dominant Brexit discourse centred on migration, 
money and control. The only food-related strand to emerge in the public debate 
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concerned access to fishing grounds. Even there, while partly about the arcane issue 
of quotas (conveniently forgetting the UK Government sold them), the fishing issue 
was also at a symbolic level, with the plight of small fishing craft memorably 
encapsulated by the image of a small boat coming up the Thames to Parliament. 
Agriculture by contrast – far more important economically and for food security - was 
a rumbling rather than high profile issue, despite having been the subject for decades 
of EU-bashing about wine lakes, beef and butter mountains, and allegedly crazy 
bureaucrats imposing unnecessary regulations.1  More conspicuously, agricultural 
su sidies s olised the UK s fi a ial o t i utio s to EU fu ds which Brexit 
proponents had argued could be allocated to the National Health Service.  Despite 
being the largest single EU budget, agri-food was not a conspicuous feature in the 
contest over whether to vote leave or remain. Spokespeople for, and experts on, 
agricultural and food industries were barely heard.  
 
Within a year of the ‘efe e du , ho e e , food e e ged, illust ati g e e da  
issues that could be problematic including: health standards, security of food 
supplies, quality controls, institutional infrastructures and animal welfare. 2  These 
e ealed the a  a s i  hi h the UK had e o e i teg ated i to the EU s 
internal market and political economy. Food accounts for an estimated 40 per cent of 
the EU acquis communautaire.  It rapidly became clear that detaching the UK from 
the EU s dense web of interconnections would be far more complicated than many 
Brexiteers had expected.  Food consequently became a conspicuous component of 
Brexit realpolitik, in which the British public took a direct personal interest. By late 
2018, it was clear that, of all the themes in the Brexit debate, the most problematic 
fo  the UK ight e se u it  of the UK s supplies of food a d edi i es. B  the  e e  
the major supermarket chains were publicly warning about shortages of supplies 
from the remaining EU member states, on whom the UK depends for about 40 per 
cent of its food supply.3 And the Government was contracting ferries to stand by to 
bring in supplies should there be snarl-ups at Dover.  
 
This belated attention should not have been surprising. Far from being politically a 
a gi al si gle issue , food issues o e t di e tl  to the li es of o di a  people 
and many contested political issues concerning the quality of life, sovereignty and 
control, culture, immigration, employment, trade and international relations. In a 
series of papers we co-edited for the inter-University academic-civil society Food 
Research Collaboration (FRC), food was shown to be central to the future of trade 
between the UK and EU, the setting of standards, the viability and histo  of the UK s 
position in international trade, the status of the border between The Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland, as well as the relationships between Westminster and 
the Devolved Administrations, animal welfare and environmental protection.  As the 
papers we edited were published, these topics received growing public profile and 
media coverage, with 20,000 downloads of FRC Briefing Papers and far higher direct 
Twitter pick-up and considerable media coverage. 
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Our first detailed overview, published in July 2017, coincided with the opening visit 
by Dr Liam Fox, UK Secretary of State for Trade to Washington DC, including a 
meeting the recently-inaugurated President Trump, both hoping to promote a US-UK 
free trade deal after a quick Brexit. Instead the official PR narrative was blown off 
ou se  the e uptio  of jou alists  uestio s a out h  the USA autho ises the 
use of chlorinated-washes to try to clean bacterial contaminating off chicken meat, 
while the EU does not permit that practice, and whether the UK-US deal would open 
up British consumers to this process. Chlo i e- ashed hi ke  e a e, a d 
remains, one of the single food issues that both symbolises concerns about the 
future of food standards and became the subject of numerous jokes and cartoons.4 It 
captured the double-edged sword of liberalised trade: cheaper mass intensively 
produced food products but lower standards.  
 
The changing face of food in EU politics 
As the si gle la gest o po e t of the EU s udget, the Co mon Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) plays a key role in the enduring rationale for the EU, dating back to the 
founding 1957 Treaty of Rome and the first major Common Market initiative at 
Stresa in 1958. Improving agricultural production in the new six state alliance was 
planned as the key to improving domestic food security. As membership grew, and 
the Common Market evolved into the EEC/EC/EU (hereafter abbreviated to EU), with 
its wider remit and structures, food as well as agriculture remained high on the EU s 
policy agenda and budgetary priorities, reflecting both the power leverage of the 
agricultural and food sectors and the commitment to avoiding disruptions to  
consumers  supplies of food. Over time, the EU s agriculture policy focus shifted from 
being land and farm-centred to becoming more food-focused.   Major problems for 
public health and the environment emerged as a consequence of the post-1945 
revolution in food supplies, prices and product proliferation.  
 
Food safety and authenticity scandals from the 1980s, accelerating in the 1990s and 
into this century, propelled the EU into ever deeper involvement in food policy-
making. Food became a key area in which the workings of the EU, in relation to 
governance, scientific research, technological innovation, competition and standards, 
all of which were eventually increasingly subject to public and political scrutiny. Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) emerged and formed international alliances to 
demand improved protection for European consumers and the environment. 
Regulatory initiatives to protect health, to provide consumers with information, to 
modify the direction of technological innovation, were the result of high profile 
public arguments, campaigns and lobbying. From the introduction of E-numbers for 
approved food additives to interventions over bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) and GM foods, the EU became the political level at which high profile conflicts 
were fought and decided. The European Commission, Council and Parliament could 
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not ignore food matters, not least since they threatened the aspiration to frictionless 
t ade ithi  the EU s Si gle Ma ket.    
  
Those decades, when food policy issues had high salience, meant that their omission 
from the Referendum debates seemed anomalous, especially given that the EU had 
had a positive impact in the UK by improving food standards from the low levels that 
had previously prevailed. The EU responded far more effectively to, for example, the 
BSE crisis of March 1996 and the GM crisis of the late 1990s than had the UK 
authorities on their own. Given this history, the neglect of farming and food in the 
pre-Referendum debates raises intriguing political questions. Was it because 
politicians had forgotten or because neither the Remain nor the Leave sides saw it as 
fertile territory, or knew what they wanted?  Or was it because those NGOs who 
might have pushed those issues were cowed by the Lobbying Act, which restricts 
their political engagement?  Or was it because the food industry was unwilling to 
appear partisan and risk alienating ministers or their customers?  We suspect a mix 
of those factors.  
 
More than chlorinated chicken? 
One issue in particular brought food onto and up the post-Referendum Brexit agenda 
- the possible import of US chlorinated chicken into the UK, as a consequence of a 
UK-USA trade deal post-Brexit. That issue resonated with deep and widespread 
concerns of UK consumers about food safety risks; and not without reason.  Since the 
mid-1980s the UK had experienced years of food scandals and had become wary, and 
often weary, about food adulteration and contamination.  While the politics of Food 
and Brexit was not restricted to chlorine-washed poultry, that issue became a symbol 
of a ide  set of o e s.  While o su e s  o e s e e i itiall  dis issed  
Brexiteers on the government benches, ministers had to reverse their early stance 
and almost over-compensate by (some of them) promising a future nirvana of ever 
higher standards of animal welfare, biodiversity and food safety once freed from EU 
shackles.  Only right-wing think-tanks such as the Adam Smith Institute and Institute 
for Economic Affairs defended chlorination as the route to easie  f ee t ade  or 
saying there was not a safety problem in the first place and that fears were the 
chimera of nanny statism. Ministers, especially in Defra have tried to 
compartmentalise the issue by framing it as one of animal welfare; they aspire to 
detach the issue from wider concerns about food standards and commercial 
practices. 
 
Given that the UK currently imports  30 per cent of its food (by value) from other EU 
Member States, and a further 11 per cent f o  thi d  ou t ies, tha ks to EU-
negotiated trade deals, it follows that under any version of Brexit in which trade in 
goods experience greater friction than previously, the security of supplies may be 
undermined.  Trading across frictional borders raises costs, and whenever rates of 
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flow are reduced, the quality and safety of perishable foods is likely to be damaged.  
I  this o te t, the atego  of pe isha le foods  e tai l  i ludes salads t u ked i  
from Mediterranean regions, as well as fish, milk and dairy products.   
 
Those considerations imply the need to address the question: from where the UK will 
obtain its food, if and when it has left the EU?  Some influential Brexiteers, including 
so e i  M s Ma s a i et, e e e thusiasti  a out the UK becoming less reliant on 
the EU for our supplies of food.  One of their reasons reflects the simple fact that 
food prices in world markets are often lower than prices within the EU.  The CAP 
does try to ensure that EU agricultural commodity prices are above those in world 
a kets. This goal has ee  a o se ue e of t o of the CAP s o je ti es: fi stl , the 
goal of stabilising food supplies and prices and secondly the goal of diminishing 
income inequalities as between rural and urban communities.  Historically, 
unregulated food and agricultural markets have been notoriously unstable, and a 
desire to learn from the chaos and dangers of the 1930s was why agriculture took 
such a central role in the formation of the Common Market. UK agricultural policy 
had similar motives, enshrined in the 1947 Agriculture Act. The operation of the CAP 
at the core of the EU has ensured that, in exchange for a price premium, consumers 
have benefitted from food prices that are far more stable than those characteristic of 
world market volatility. Consumerists and neo-liberals argued in the 1970s and 1980s 
that this pe alised o su e s a d led to ostl  food ou tai s  ut the  ig o ed 
the benefits of stability.  A hard Brexit raises the spectre once more of a return, at 
the very least, to ide  flu tuatio s i  food p i es a d Ste li g s e ha ge ates. 
 
So- alled Atla ti ists , such as Liam Fox and Nigel Farage are amongst those 
Brexiteers who are enthusiastic at the prospect of replacing EU food imports with 
food imports from the USA and other low-cost suppliers wherever they may be. US 
food prices are often below those in the EU, but that is largely a consequence of the 
size a d desig  of US Fede al Go e e t s su sidies to US fa e s, hi h a uall  
amount to more than $20 billio . I o i all , hile a  B e itee s ite the CAP s 
subsidies as a reason for leaving the EU, in part so that the UK can reduce its 
agricultural subsidy payments, they seem untroubled by buying heavily subsidised 
produce from the USA, and ignoring how food is once again a political weapon in the 
US-China tariff tensions under Presidents Trump and Xi. 
 
Importing substantially more food from the USA is, however, widely and rightly seen 
as problematic in the UK, because of concerns about weaker US safety standards, as 
ell as fi a iall  u de i i g e e  the UK s ost o petiti e fa s.  I  se e al 
important respects, US food quality and safety standards are lower than those in the 
EU, and consequently lower than those currently applying in the UK. Several of those 
differences in safety standards were highlighted by the p ese t autho s  pape  in July 
2017.  There we provided four examples of weaker US standards than those in the 
EU, namely: beef hormones, bovine somatotropin (BST) used in milk production, 
genetically modified crops, and the use of chlorinated disinfectants to reduce 
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bacterial contamination of poultry carcasses.  Of those four examples, it was the 
issue of hlo i e- ashed hi ke  that aptu ed edia atte tio , ot e ause it 
posed the greatest risk but because it could be encapsulated in a simple phrase, and 
was the easiest to explain. The issue subsequently gained significant traction with 
oad ast edia a d ith the B itish pu li .  Chlo i e- ashed hi ke  e e ged as 
the sine qua non of debates about the future of UK-USA trade relations post-Brexit.  
In July 2017, the International Trade Secretary, Liam Fox, complained that the media 
were obsessed with chlorine-washed chicken. By June 2019, a Google search for 
hlo i e ashed hi ke  UK  p odu ed around 803,000 hits, which had accumulated 
over the two years since our original report.   
 
While the elevation of this totemic issue up the public Brexit agenda may have been 
unexpected, it nonetheless posed significant challenges for UK policy-makers.  Firstly, 
it is important to appreciate that chlorinated water is just one of six chemical 
disinfectants used in the USA. Moreover chemical disinfectants can be used not just 
on US poultry meat, but also on other types of meat, as well as on fish, fruits and 
vegetables.  Currently in the EU, lactic acid is the only chemical disinfectant allowed 
for use on bovine meat. Chlorinated water can lawfully be used in the EU, but only to 
wash leaf vegetables, such as bagged salads, but not for use on meat. 
 
It is important to appreciate why the US authorities permit the extensive use of 
chemical disinfectants; it is because the levels of microbiological contamination of 
their food supply are noticeably higher than is the case, and that could be deemed 
lawful, in the EU. Standards of hygiene and animal welfare in US livestock production 
are far poorer than is deemed acceptable in the EU. The US approach has been ex-
post: to permit microbial contamination, and then to use chemical disinfectants as 
hat the  all pathoge  edu tio  t eat e ts . The EU s app oa h ex ante) is to try 
to ensure that foods are produced sufficiently hygienically that they do not require 
disinfection.  
 
Shapiro, representing the Humane Society of the USA, has characterised and 
criticised US policy, explaining that:  
When producers bring a new flock of birds into a shed, standard practice 
is to leave the manure-laden litter from past flocks on the ground. So 
every couple months, new birds are living on top of prior generations' 
aste…Those a i als e d up i  defeathe i g ta ks , esse tiall  ats of 
scalding-hot water, while fully conscious. As a first order of business in 
those ta ks, the i ds let loose all thei  aste. It s the sa e water that 
countless other birds will then be put through, spreading feces from bird 
to i d like a ildfi e o  a d  da … It's lea  that the hlo i e is si pl  
an attempt to put lipstick on a pig — or decontaminant on a chicken.5 
 
Whereas, Monique Goyens, head of the Bureau of European Union of 
Co su e s, has e plai ed that the EU s:  
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…fa  to fo k app oa h e ui es a se ies of steps all alo g the 
production chain to ensure food sold to consumers ultimately is safe. In 
the case of poultry, hygiene stipulations at farm level include the use of 
dedicated clothing and footwear by farm workers to avoid bringing 
bacteria into poultry houses.6 
 
The significance of the difference between US and EU policies was highlighted by an 
important paper published in Spring 2018.  Scientists at Southampton University 
reported that applying chlorinated water can pose a threat to human health by 
providing illusory reassurance, because the treatment does not disinfect the food, it 
merely blocks the customary detection tests.7 It therefore can give the misleading 
impression that food is safe when it is seriously contaminated.  That might help to 
explain the fact that rates of microbial food poisoning in the USA are significantly 
higher than those in the UK and EU. 
 
The arguments concerning the acceptability and safety of beef from cattle injected 
with synthetic hormones as growth promotors,  milk from cows injected with a 
synthetic lactation-stimulating hormone called bovine somatotropin (or BST), and the 
use of antibiotics in livestock production, as well as GM crops are technically more 
complicated than those concerning chemical disinfectants. In every one of those 
examples, there are sound scientific reasons for concluding that the US food safety 
standards are lower than those that apply throughout the EU and which 
consequently apply in the UK u less it d ops  i to WTO ules i  hi h ase it ill 
default to Codex Alimentarius Commission baseline standards (to which we return 
below).  We here highlight some issues with potential to raise public sensibility on 
either human or animal health and welfare grounds: 
 
In relation to beef from cattle treated with supplementary growth-promoting 
hormones, the Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures Relating to Public Health 
concluded in 1999 that there was evidence that several of the hormones used in the 
USA, and other jurisdictions, may pose a risk to the health of vulnerable groups, and 
for the others there was insufficient evidence to be confident that they were 
acceptably safe.  Since then, those shortcoming have not been remedied. 
 
To provide a marginal increase in milk yields from dairy cows, almost all US dairy 
cattle are injected with a lactation-stimulating synthetic hormone that in the USA is 
known as bovine growth hormone, and in the EU as bovine somatotropin (BST).  
There is clear scientific evidence showing that the use of BST in US dairy herds causes 
a statistically significant increase in the incidence of udder infections, or mastitis.8 
Conseque tl  ilk i  the USA a  ha e a highe  so ati  ell ou t  tha  is 
acceptable in the EU; in non-technical terms, it can contain more pus. The US 
authorities do not deny that treated cows suffer higher rates of mastitis, but they 
deem that not to be a pro le  of isk , ut e el  o e of he d a age e t .  The 
fa s  he d a age e t tool is the ad i ist atio  of a ti ioti s to i fe ted a i als.  
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Consequently, there are high levels of residues of antibiotics in US milk and dairy 
products.  In November 2017 it was reported that the sales of antibiotics to livestock 
farmers had risen by 27per cent in the USA since 2009, whereas UK farmers had 
reported a 26 per cent drop.9  The EU bans the use of BST, and imports of milk and 
dairy products from cows treated with BST, on ground of both public health and 
animal welfare. 
 
Debates about the safety of GM crops, food and especially animals, both in terms of 
their acceptability as food for people or for livestock and their environmental 
impacts are profoundly contested.  Some, especially in the USA want to portray the 
relevant science as if it is unproblematically secure and entirely reassuring, while 
others, more commonly in the EU highlight remaining gaps in data sets, limitations 
characterising the scope of current EU risk assessments, and evidence of possible 
hazards and risks. Some Brexiteers have cited opportunities to commercialise GM 
food production as a reason why the UK should leave the EU.  One thing, about 
which confident predictions can be made, is that if GM foods were introduced into 
the UK, under the provisions of a UK-USA trade deal, but labelled in accordance with 
current EU labelling requirements, there would be considerable consumer resistance 
to buying them.  If, on the other hand, the USA succeeded in persuading a future UK 
government that it should accept all and any GM foods, but without any of the 
currently applicable labelling requirements, that government would pay a very high 
political price at subsequent elections.  Telling UK shoppers that they could no longer 
have access to information that had previously been provided and which had 
influenced their choices, will be remarkably unpopular.  Insisting that consumers are 
less well-informed, in the name of market liberalisation, would be both counter-
intuitive and politically unsustainable. 
 
The US authorities routinely insist that all of thei  sta da ds a e ased o  sou d 
s ie e , a d that a  othe  ju isdi tio  ith diffe e t sta da ds is ei g 
u s ie tifi , ut that is isleadi g.  Fi stl , the ele a t s ie e is ofte  i o plete, 
uncertain and equivocal.  Secondly, scientific considerations alone never settle policy 
issues.  EU standards typically differ from US standards not because EU scientists put 
different interpretations of identical data sets, but because they ask different, and 
more demanding questions, and consequently require different tests and data sets.  
 
The key points to draw from those examples are that:  
• There are significant differences between food safety and quality standards 
between the EU on the one hand and other countries, such as the USA, from 
which the UK might consider buying more food after Brexit. 
• In numerous respects EU (and therefore UK) standards are higher than those 
in the USA. 
• The e a e good s ie tifi  g ou ds a d poli  easo s fo  the EU s adoptio  of 
those standards.  They could withstand, and in some cases have withstood, 
challenges at a WTO dispute panel. 
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The implications of those food examples can be generalised, and not just to issues of 
animal welfare and environmental protection, to support the judgement that post-
Brexit trade deals that would result in lower standards and less safe products will be 
highly controversial.   If Brexit happens and standards of safety and quality of goods 
and services decline that would almost certainly contribute to the unpopularity of 
the UK s depa tu e from the EU. 
 
Taki g a k o t ol  a  e a good rhetorical slogan, but hard to achieve in a global 
food economy where supply chains are so interconnected. The claim that, on leaving 
the EU, the UK a  ease to e a ule take , a d e o i g i stead a rule- ake , 
and trade freely with countries in all parts of the globe, is a dangerous illusion.  If, as 
an independent country, the UK sets rules covering food safety and standards that do 
not meet the requirements of our trading partners, we may be able to import foods 
from anywhere, if their products conform to our rules.  But UK producers will not be 
able to export to countries with tighter standards than the UK, unless they incur 
extra costs manufacturing products for export that differ from those for domestic 
sale.  If ou a t to e po t, ou  p odu ts ust o fo  to the i po te s  ules. The 
suggestion that the UK could substantially increase its exports while adopting a 
unique set of rules that will not be shared by our trading partners is a fantasy. In 
practice, the UK must decide which agricultural and food rules it will take: those of 
the EU, the USA or the WTO.   
 
The WTO rules, as they relate to internationally traded agricultural and food 
products, are set by an organisation known as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
(or Codex).  Codex was established jointly by the World Health Organisation and the 
UN Food and Agriculture Organisation in the 1960s, to facilitate international trade in 
agricultural and food products, by providing recommended minimum safety and 
quality standards. When the WTO was established in January 1995, Codex standards 
became de juré and de facto minimum standards in international trade.  WTO 
Member States when importing can lawfully exclude products that fail to meet Codex 
standards, and exporting states could have a legitimate complaint if another WTO 
Member State refused to accept products complying with Codex standards.  Codex 
standards are decided by unanimity amongst its member states.  
 
Codex has 189 members and given that its members include under-developed 
countries as well as industrialised countries, Codex standards are typically lower than 
those applying in industrialised jurisdictions, such as the EU and the USA.   WTO 
standards are therefore even weaker than US standards, which are below those in 
the EU.  T adi g o  WTO te s  would therefore entail accepting products at what 
are in effect standards that are the lowest global common denominator.  If that were 
to happen food policy in the UK would become more, rather than less, contentious. 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
While the UK has been in the EU it has exercised considerable influence on EU 
standards, not just for agricultural and food products, but in many other respects 
too.  As one of the larger and wealthier EU Member States, it has been 
disproportionately influential in EU policy-making.  If the UK leaves and tries 
negotiating a trade deal with the USA it will be in a far weaker position than it has 
been as an EU Member State.  If, on the other hand, the UK chooses to trade with all-
comers on WTO rules, it will be 1 of 189 members, and therefore even less influential 
than it has been in the EU, or even than it has been at Codex, by virtue of being an 
EU Member State.  It remains to be seen if UK ministers will choose to undermine 
food safety in the UK in exchange for some anticipated commercial benefits to other 
sectors. 
 
Wilbur Ross, the US Commerce Secretary, has insisted that the UK would need to 
accede to US food standards or at least break with EU ones, if the UK wanted wider 
trade deals. Ross has argued that the UK should ot let itself e ullied  the EU .  
His implicit advice was rather that the UK should accept US conditions, which could 
be interpreted as allowing itself to be bullied by the USA. One thing we can be sure of 
is that if, after Brexit, the UK accepts chlorine-washed poultry from the USA, UK 
producers will also demand the right to use that treatment too, in the name of a 
le el o petiti e pla i g field . The e is also the possi ilit  that, if the use of 
chemicals disinfectants is allowed for poultry, the UK might slide further down a 
slippery slope and permit the use of such disinfectants on other foods such as fruit, 
vegetables and fish. Debates about: what level of standards to apply after Brexit? 
Who would set them? And how? are set to be key issues for UK consumers. 
 
Food system restructuring post Brexit 
Behind the apparently technical issues of chlorination and hormone use lie important 
politics, not just of farming, but about the structure and functioning of the food 
supply chain. UK farming has been both changed, and propped up, by CAP payments 
and rules. The sums received by UK farmers have varied over time but have generally 
enabled many farms to survive. Def a s a ual esti ates of the Total Income from 
Farming (TIFF) show how reliant UK farming is upon EU derived subsidies.   
 
Although many farmers voted for Brexit, the consequences for English farmers at 
least are becoming clear, following the publication of Mi hael Go e s Ag i ultu e Bill 
and its forerunner, the 2018 Health and Harmony Consultation Paper. Subsidies are 
promised to remain as per the EU until 2022, but then be progressively reduced. 
Although the policy language is now about higher subsidies for ecosystems support, 
the pressures on the national budget are likely to constrain that option, and HM 
Treasury has long favoured a New Zealand style exit from any farm subsidies. We 
therefore expect that tensions between sectors in food supply chains, especially 
between farmers, processors and retailers to rise. Incentives to have cheaper 
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ingredients might over-ride any willingness to pay more in exchange for higher 
standards.  
 
When the UK joined the Common Market in 1973, the revolution in manufacturing, 
retailing and mass catering was already underway. Retail Price Maintenance had 
been abolished in 1964, which began a period of price wars between the 
manufacturers, who until then had been able to set prices for shops, and the retailers 
who were concentrating by supermarketisation on a grand scale. With the 
emergence of a handful of giant retail chains, the UK food sector was able to exert 
big influence in the EU. Cross-border alliances were formed via buyer groups. In the 
21st century, the UK food system was further altered by the rapid growth of the 
foodservice sector. Eating out – hithe to a Eu opea  ultu e – expanded, if patchily, 
across Britain. Today, the UK food economy is dominated by the rivalry of three 
massive sectors: manufacturing, retailing and food service. Farmers receives only 7 
per cent of the gross value added (GVA) from the UK food system.   While farming 
makes £8.4 bn GVA and fishing a paltry £0.8 bn, retailing earns £29.8 bn, catering 
£32.4 bn, manufacturing £28.8 bn, and even wholesalers makes £12 bn.  Meanwhile, 
the UK food system as a whole has a rising trade deficit. In 2017, the UK s food trade 
gap was £24.2 bn in the red.  
 
The discomfort and displeasure that Brexit disruption was already causing to 
investment and supply chain management was made clear by food businesses in 
private from 2017 and in public from 2018.  The reasons are not hard to fathom.  
Huge investments in just-in-time supply chains across borders have been made since 
the 1992 completion of the Single Market. There is little available storage in the UK – 
raising questions about food security in times of crisis, a d the UK s heavy reliance on 
sophisticated production and delivery systems. The implications of those 
arrangements fuelled politically sensitive discussions within, and outside, the 
Government about security of supplies, stockpiling and continuity of supply, 
concluding that food supplies could easily be disrupted by a o-deal  Brexit. When 
the Food Research Collaboration published its damning report on food security 
planning in 2018, this was initially denied by Defra, only for it to be acknowledged 
two days later.  
 
At stake was a political failure of the Government, and indeed HM Opposition too, to 
clarify their vision for a post-Brexit UK food system. That Brexit disrupted business 
was clear. Also it clearly undermined the emerging thinking in Wales and Scotland 
about enhancing environmental and social sustai a ilit . The E glish Ag i ultu e Bill s 
focuses on environmental land management, rather than on foods, which means that 
there is no clarity about a national (English or UK) food policy.  There are significant 
differences between reorienting supply to meet the food deficit from across the 
Atlantic, globally, or outer-Europe, or continuing to reply on EU sources. Those will 
not be changes that could be made quickly.  For there to have been next to no 
discussion of food supply sourcing since the Referendum is extraordinary, given the 
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importance and vulnerability of supply chains. Perhaps this should not be a surprise, 
given widespread ignorance about the UK s reliance on an infrastructure of 
institutions, logistics, legislation, food science, technical support and more.  The 
European Commission is not a massive bureaucracy; there are more civil servants in 
Edinburgh running Scotland than there are in the entire European Commission.  
Nonetheless, the EU has created a network of at least 35 pertinent institutions, from 
which the UK will lose participation following almost all versions of Brexit. These 
include the European Food Safety Authority, the Veterinary system, the traceability 
and fraud prevention systems.  
 
Ironically, given its high profile in the run-up to the Referendum, the issue of migrant 
labour has become less conspicuous three years on. Even Mr Farage admitted as 
much. After the Referendum, the UK food industry eventually drew attention to its 
reliance on EU migrant labour. The horticulture sector was quick to point out that it 
was already suffering because of the closure of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers 
Scheme (SAWS) and that the f ee  flo  of ig a t la ou  u de pi ed the ia ilit  
of B itish  ho ti ultu e su h as st a e ies. But catering and manufacturing are, if 
anything, even more reliant on migrant labour. Some argue that this will encourage  
long overdue investment in automation and productivity, but the realists suggest that 
those technologies are at least a decade away from being effective and affordable.   
 
The UK s food suppl  also elies o  many highly qualified people.  In particular, 
legislation requires that before slaughter all animals are checked for their health by a 
qualified veterinarian, and that post-slaughter their carcasses are checked by a 
professional veterinarian to ensure they are healthy and safe.  Almost all the vets 
working in UK abattoirs and meat cutting plants have been non-UK EU citizens, and 
many of them are expected to leave the UK after Brexit, though some indications 
have emerged from Defra suggesting that the government is considering reducing the 
role of Vets in monitoring farm activities. This would be another example of 
weakening current safety regulations. 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that post-Brexit food governance raises important but unresolved 
questions about the distribution and exercise of power in relation to food and 
farming, at home and in the countries with which the UK trades.  Those 
considerations include food standards and food security, which have high public 
salience, as well as others that are less widely debated, such as the future of 
agricultural subsidies. Important though food safety is – not least to business viability 
– safety is by no means the only food issue raised by Brexit. Questions about the 
futu e of the UK s food s ste , post-Brexit, are not simply a matter of forecasting, 
they concern the choices that are to be made.  Those choices concern what kind of 
food system is wanted and who will be empowered to decide from where our food 
will come, and how safe and well-labelled it will be.  Those contested issues remain 
unresolved, but Defra belatedly instituted in June 2019 a Food Strategy process to be 
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concluded in mid-2020, led by Henry Dimbleby co-founder of Leon, the organic fast 
food chain.  It is hard to see how an implementable food strategy could be devised in 
conditions of such over-whelming uncertainty but at last some policy development is 
underway and it must be judged for how it proposes a transformation to a food 
system combining sustainability, social justice and food security for the UK.  
 
No legislation is yet in train (at the time of writing). The case we have made here is 
that, while the totemic issue of chlorinated chicken might have been high profile and 
not without reason, it has in fact been just one among a more complex web of food 
issues emerging in the Brexit debate. The resolution of the myriad issues arising from 
dislocation from the EU suggests that food matters will again surprise politicians, 
unless due attention is given. 
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